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Latvia’s ‘Russian left’: trapped between ethnic, socialist, and social-
democratic identities 
 
Ammon Cheskin and Luke March  
 
Following the 2008 economic crisis, Latvia suffered the worst loss of output in 
the world, with GDP collapsing 25 percent.1 Yet Latvia’s radical left has 
shown no notable ideological or strategic response. Existing RLPs did not 
secure significant political gains from the crisis, nor have new challengers 
benefitted. Indeed, Latvia has been heralded as a ‘poster child’ for austerity as 
the right has continued to dominate government policy.2  
This chapter explores this puzzle. Although the economic crisis was 
economically destructive, we argue that the political responses have been 
consistently ethnicised in Latvia. Additionally, the Latvian left has been 
equally challenged intellectually and strategically by the ethnically-framed 
Ukrainian crisis of 2014.  
 Special attention is given to the Latvian Socialist Party (Latvijas 
Sociālistiskā partija, LSP), Latvia’s most prominent (albeit small) RLP. We 
argue that one of the principal reasons for the LSP’s inability to exploit the 
crisis is its strategic inertness and stubborn adherence to the ideological tenets 
of Marxism-Leninism. Second is its preference for sheltering within a wider 
electoral alliance of ‘Russian’ centre-left parties.  
The ‘Russianness’ of the LSP and the Latvian centre-left has its 
primary explanation in Latvia’s Soviet legacies, entailing the admixture of 
socialism with Russification promoted by the ‘colonial’ USSR. In truth, these 
legacies remain live because they have been utilised by political entrepreneurs 
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who have conflated appeals based on socialism and ethnicity. This has 
complicated the efforts of centre-left and radical left parties, who have largely 
been unable (and indeed, often unwilling) to shake off popular associations 
with communism, the Soviet past, and their ‘Russianness.’ 
Precisely because Latvia’s political spectrum can be characterised in 
terms of ethnic, rather than ideological, cleavages, the responses of the 
country’s radical left have been heavily constrained by ethnic considerations 
that are peculiar to Latvia’s post-Soviet political environment (although with 
some similarities in Estonia).3 The conflation of ethnic and ideological 
‘leftness’ explains the ultimate failure of RLPs to gain wider political and 
social traction in Latvia. Crucially, it has almost entirely prevented the 
country’s extant radical left from moving beyond its communist roots and 
articulating an anti-austerity message that could transcend ethnic cleavages. 
This chapter illustrates these peculiarities by focusing also on the wider 
Latvian left. Because the LSP’s political fortunes are deeply contingent on the 
resonance of its Soviet aesthetics and its appeal to the Russian-speaking 
electorate, it is impossible to ignore the wider (‘Russian’) context within which 
it operates.  
Accordingly, we show how the positions of the Social Democratic 
Party ‘Harmony’ (Sociāldemokrātiskā Partija ‘Saskaņa’), the LSP’s most 
regular coalition partner, and since 2011 the largest represented party in the 
Latvian parliament, impacted upon its response to the economic crisis. The 
third main ‘Russian left’ party we examine is For Human Rights in United 
Latvia (Par cilvēka tiesībām vienotā Latvijā, PCTVL), which has latterly 
developed from a declaratively left-wing, socially-oriented party to the 
ethnicised, radical-right Latvian Russian Union (Latvijas Krievu savienība, 
LKS). In 2002, PCTVL was Latvia’s second-largest parliamentary party. 
However, it failed to gain any seats in the 2010, 2011 and 2014 parliamentary 
elections.4  
 
Latvia and the Economic Crisis 
For Latvia, the economic crisis represents classic ‘boom and bust.’ Real, year-
on-year GDP percentage growth had been in double digits for the three years 
preceding the crisis.5 From late 2007, however, there followed over two years 
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of economic recession; a 70 percent collapse in housing prices and rise in 
unemployment to 20.7 percent compounded the plummeting GDP.6  
One of the most striking aspects of the Latvian case is that, despite such 
economic hardships, the right-wing governing coalition (at times a numerical 
minority within the Latvian parliament [Saeima]), was able to push through 
extensive austerity measures with only one brief period of public, social 
opposition. The austerity measures focused on so-called ‘internal 
devaluation’7: public-sector wages were cut 35 percent, 14,000 public sector 
workers lost their jobs, 29 of a total 49 hospitals were closed, and pensions 
were cut by 10 percent.8 At the same time, the national currency (the Lat) was 
pegged to the Euro, preventing purposeful currency depreciation and 
eventually helping Latvia join the eurozone in 2014.  
Public anger at government handling of the crisis peaked on 13 January 
2009, when approximately 10,000 people took to Riga’s streets, demanding the 
dissolution of Parliament. The protests culminated in violence as nearby shops 
and vehicles were attacked and protesters tried (unsuccessfully) to force their 
way into Parliament. The protests had been called for by opposition parties and 
trade unions and fuelled speculation that Latvian society was moving away 
from its traditional post-Soviet passivity towards a more radicalised ‘Greek’ 
protest model.9  
Although this appeared a fertile context for exploitation by radical left 
groups, the protests soon diminished, especially after Prime Minister Ivars 
Godmanis resigned and Valdis Dombrovskis (of the centre-right New Era 
party) was appointed to head a re-jigged coalition in March 2009. Thereafter, 
notwithstanding small-scale, sporadic protests, the Latvian public faced the 
ensuing austerity drive stoically. Soon after economic recovery began in early 
2010, Prime Minister Dombrovskis, who had overseen many of the harsh 
reforms, co-authored a book proclaiming the exemplary nature of the reform 
outcomes: ‘social unrest was minimal, and extremism nearly absent… 
traditional populism lost out and ethnic tensions were reduced’.10  
Certainly, the radical left did not benefit electorally from the economic 
crisis. Whereas the centre-left ‘Harmony Centre’ coalition (in which the LSP 
participates) did dramatically increase its votes in the 2010 and 2011 Saeima 
elections, Latvian voters explicitly backed right-wing incumbent governments. 
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Unexpectedly, Dombrovskis’ Unity coalition received the greatest number of 
seats (33 of 100) in 2010, and despite repeated coalition turnover thereafter 
(common to Latvian politics), Unity returned to office in 2011 and 2014. 
Conversely, the LSP’s vote and seat share remained stagnant throughout the 
crisis, even losing one of four seats in 2010 (see Table 11.1). We now explore 
the different, but ultimately unsuccessful strategies of the main parties of the 
Russian left. 
 
 
Table 1: Representation of the Latvian Socialist Party in parliament, 
1996-2014 
Parliamentary 
election 
LSP 
seats 
Total 
number of 
fraction 
seats 
Party list 
1995 (6th Saeima) 5 5 Socialist Party of Latvia 
1998 (7th Saeima) 4 16 National Harmony Party (For 
Human Rights in a United 
Latvia fraction) 
2002 (8th Saeima) 5 25 For Human Rights in a United 
Latvia 
2006 (9th Saeima) 4 17 Harmony Centre 
2010 (10th 
Saeima) 
3 29 Harmony Centre 
2011 (11th 
Saeima) 
3 31 Harmony Centre 
2014 (12th 
Saeima) 
3 24 Social Democratic Party 
‘Harmony’ 
 
 
Latvia’s ‘Russian Left’ 
 Latvia’s demographic situation has significantly shaped the development of 
RLPs in Latvia. In 1989, ethnic Latvians made up just 52 percent of the 
country’s population, while Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians (mostly 
Russian-speaking) comprised 42 percent.11 The bulk of these Russophones 
were Soviet-era migrants, provoking calls for the ‘de-Russification’ and 
‘decolonisation’ of Latvia following independence in 1991.12 Accordingly, the 
majority of Russophones were initially denied Latvian citizenship and only in 
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1998 were the majority of non-citizens allowed to apply for naturalisation. To 
this day, a significant proportion (37 percent) of Russian speakers do not hold 
Latvian citizenship and are not eligible to vote.13 This means that the Russian-
speaking vote represents roughly 20 percent of today’s population. 
Jānis Ikstens notes that, as a consequence of Latvia’s demographic 
peculiarities, the party system has largely been determined by two cleavages – 
ethnic and socio-economic.14 Latvia’s political spectrum traverses left to right, 
but often conflates socio-economic positions with ethnic ones.15 In many 
respects, this is due to ‘a tendency for “Latvian” parties to adopt right-of-centre 
positions on economic issues, with the “Slavic” parties leaning towards leftist 
solutions in economic policy’. Consequently, while relatively weak urban-rural 
and liberal-conservative cleavages are observable, ‘the ethnic cleavage has 
remained the major division shaping the Latvian party system.’16 
Notwithstanding the ethnic divides in Latvian society, the ethnicisation 
of economic orientations is particularly striking when considering high levels 
of support for leftist social ideals in Latvia. Several surveys have pointed to 
leftist social preferences not only among Russian speakers, but also many 
ethnic Latvians.17 In this respect, Latvia seems little different from other post-
communist countries where a paternalistic, egalitarian ‘socialist value culture’ 
underpinned strong left-wing parties.18 However, the post-Soviet Latvian 
electorate has never elected a left-leaning government. The major explanation 
for this discrepancy must be that the political expression of even the social-
democratic ‘left’ is tied discursively to concepts associated with the Soviet past 
and, by extension, to Russianness. An overview of the parties of the ‘Russian 
left’ helps to illustrate this point.   
As well as being a minority, the Russian-speaking electorate is 
ideologically divided, with three principal tendencies: nostalgic ‘Soviet 
internationalists’, ‘Great Russia’ imperialists and supporters of 
multiethnicity.19 Such ideological divisions underpin today’s Latvian Socialist 
Party, Latvian Russian Unity and Harmony respectively, and explain why their 
coalitions have often been fractious.   
The LSP has been Latvia’s most prominent RLP since its formation in 
1994. It partially represents a ‘communist successor party’: although it does 
not claim direct continuity with the (former ruling) Latvian Communist Party, 
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this is political expediency: the KPL was banned in 1991. Latvian legislation 
still prohibits communist symbols and prevents KPL members after 13 January 
1991 running for national office. 
 Indeed, continuity with the communist past is clearly apparent in both 
ideology and personnel. The LSP is a Marxist party, holding steadfast to Soviet 
shibboleths such as democratic centralism, class struggle, imperialism and 
proletarian internationalism. It remains rooted to theories of dialectical and 
historical materialism.20 In comparative terms, the party is a nostalgic 
‘conservative communist’ party, evidenced by membership of the International 
Meetings and INITIATIVE of Communist and Workers’ Parties headed by the 
Greek Communist Party. Indicatively, the LSP’s leader from 1999 until 
retirement in 2015 was Alfrēds Rubiks, last head of the KPL, who was 
imprisoned from 1995-7 for conspiring to overthrow the new Latvian 
government while supporting the August 1991 Soviet coup against Mikhail 
Gorbachev.   
Some successor parties have benefited at elections from pointing to 
their ‘usable past’, i.e a history of governing competence or independent 
decision-making in the Soviet era.21 But the LSP has little usable to offer: 
notwithstanding its internationalism, its arch-conservatism is buttressed by a 
strong link with Russianness. Whereas successor parties in Russia, Ukraine and 
Moldova have been able to utilise (some) positive associations with the Soviet 
developmental model, in the Baltic states many simply associate this model 
with Russian colonialism.22 After all, only roughly one-third of KPL 
membership was ethnically Latvian, making it the least ‘national’ Soviet 
communist party, and one perceived as a ‘foreign’ entity.23  
Little wonder then, that from 1995 onwards the LSP has occupied a 
niche position, with three to five deputies (of 100) in the Latvian Saeima 
(Table 11.1). Additionally, the party obtained one seat in the 2009 European 
Parliament elections (taken up by Rubiks, because of his ban on standing in 
domestic elections). Given the Saeima’s five-percent threshold, these modest 
results forced the party to canvass within a number of wider left and centre-left 
alliances (see Table 11.1) since the run-up to the 1998 Saeima elections. 
 As a result, it is impossible to understand the development of the 
Latvian radical left without also understanding the challenges and opportunities 
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afforded to the broader left in Latvia. The LSP contested the 1998 elections 
under the People’s Harmony Party list and soon afterwards both parties joined 
the coalition For Human Rights in United Latvia (PCTVL).  
In 2003, both the LSP and the People’s Harmony Party left the PCTVL 
coalition following acrimonious disputes about its strategic direction. The 
People’s Harmony Party then created Harmony Centre (Saskaņas Centrs SC) 
which in 2006 displaced PCTVL as the most represented ‘Russian’ alliance in 
Latvian politics, taking most of its 2002 vote. SC united a number of centre-left 
parties with the more radical LSP. In 2010 the centre-left parties within the 
alliance merged to form The Social Democratic Party ‘Harmony’ (SDPS). SC 
therefore represented a notable shift towards the centre-left. In its 2005 
programme, the LSP justified its participation within SC by noting that it was 
forced to cooperate ‘under the conditions of bourgeois dictatorship’, while all 
the time maintaining that transition from capitalism to socialism was 
inevitable.24  
In 2014, Harmony Centre was officially dissolved and LSP and 
Harmony contested the 2014 elections to the European Parliament separately. 
After a poor showing in these elections (LSP lost their single seat while SDPS 
only obtained one European mandate), Harmony allocated LSP three seats 
from its party list in the 2014 Saeima elections, despite previously hinting that 
it might sever ties completely. Continued cooperation is therefore a marriage of 
convenience rather than an ideological alliance, with both parties sensing that 
their electoral success is maximised through collaboration. Nevertheless, 
collaboration remains problematic: the LSP’s obvious continuity with its 
Soviet predecessor sullies Harmony’s increasing aspirations to be coalitionable 
and reinforces the unofficial cordon sanitaire against the ‘Russian parties’ in 
Latvian national politics. 
At the same time, ‘Latvian’ left-leaning parties (i.e. parties whose 
electorates are comprised of significant ethnic Latvians) have long been unable 
to garner substantial electoral support. Significantly, 1998 was the last time any 
such ‘Latvian’ party gained Saeima representation. The Social Democratic 
Workers’ Party (LSDSP) (a merger of the former ex-Menshevik party 
influential in Latvia’s interwar republic and the pro-independence split from 
the KPL) obtained 14 seats in 1998 but failed to return a single deputy in 2002. 
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The LSDSP has tried to distance itself from the communist past. It sets out a 
centre-left but anti-austerity programme and supports Latvia’s EU membership 
(unlike the LSP) and NATO membership (unlike the LSP and PCTVL).25 But 
not even the predominance of ethnic Latvian members and Latvian-language 
literature has insulated it from association with Russianness. The very use of 
‘social’ in the party name negatively ties the organisation to the Soviet past.26 
Indicatively, the principal catalyst for the party splitting disastrously in 2002 
was its co-operation with PCTVL in the Riga municipality in 2001-5. Breaking 
the taboo on co-operation with ‘Russian’ organisations has caused lasting 
damage.27 Indeed, as Stephen Bloom notes, after the demise of the LSDSP, 
‘ethnic Latvian voters with leftist political views must either cross the ethnic 
cleavage and vote for a Russian minority party, or waste their votes by voting 
for a smaller ethnic Latvian leftist party.’28   
The discursive association of PCTVL and the LSP with Russianness 
can therefore be attributed to a number of factors, not least the Soviet 
experience of communism. But even relatively moderate left-wing parties such 
as Harmony (which unlike PCTVL and the LSP originated in the independence 
movement) have been unable to shake the notion that they are exclusively 
Russian, precisely because they espouse leftist values and aims. At the same 
time, the majority of parties that wish to be seen as ‘normal’, ‘Latvian’ parties 
have often adopted right-wing policies in order to distance themselves from 
any association with Russianness and Russia.  
Ethnic polarisation has therefore persisted in the context of Latvia’s 
‘ethnic democracy’ or ‘militant democracy’,29 exemplified by the restrictive 
citizenship policy premised on the exclusion of ‘Moscow’s protégés’.30 
Initially, only citizens of the pre-Soviet Latvian Republic and their direct 
ancestors were eligible for Latvian citizenship. The majority of Russian-
speakers in Latvia were Soviet-era immigrants, so were consequently 
automatically excluded from citizenship.  
A major concern of left-wing parties in Latvia has, understandably, 
centred on these thorny issues of citizenship. The PCTVL and Harmony 
fractions have campaigned extensively for greater minority rights for Latvia’s 
Slavic population, with focus on education, citizenship and language policies.31 
Although the pursuit of equal rights is a cardinal aim of left-wing parties the 
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world over, in the Latvian context, this inevitably led to the impression that the 
left was fighting for the rights of the Russian population in opposition to the 
newly-acquired sovereignty of the Latvian Republic. For Ivars Ijabs the left’s 
problem results from the centrality of nation-building to Latvia’s democratic 
institutions. He notes that ‘the initial exclusion of the Soviet-era immigrants 
from the Latvian demos was seen as a precondition for democracy, and a 
particular type of nation-building, centred on the ethnic Latvian nation, as a 
necessary limitation of democracy for the sake of democracy itself’.32 
Consequently, traditionally left-wing concerns are often perceived as 
inherently threatening to Latvia’s nation-building project and constitutional 
order. 
Additionally, the ‘Russian left’ has struggled to avoid entanglement in 
Latvia’s fraught memory politics. In 2010 Harmony Centre become the second 
largest party in Parliament. Following still greater success in the 2011 snap 
general election (emerging as the largest party), SC faced inclusion in a new 
government coalition for the first time.33 To some extent, inclusion was 
controversial because of SC’s leftist economic programme, which advocated 
increasing budget expenditure in contrast to the general consensus among 
‘Latvian’ parties for prolonging internal devaluation. However, the central 
argument for excluding SC rested on the party’s perceived pro-Sovietism. For 
example, in the daily newspaper Diena V. Liepiņš [Zatlers’ Reform Party MP] 
did not rule out future cooperation with SC, but noted it was then impossible 
because ‘he was not convinced of SC’s ability to be loyal to the Latvian 
state...“the fact of the matter is that they do not acknowledge the occupation. 
They think that it was a fateful event which occurred and they do not have a 
problem with that”’ (Diena 25.09.11 emphasis added). 
 
Political Consequences of the Economic Crisis 
This section shows how ethnic divisions in Latvian politics have shaped the 
response of political parties to the 2008 economic crisis. Indeed, the economic 
and social upheavals of the crisis have failed fundamentally to challenge the 
clear political boundaries between ‘Russian/Slavic’ and ‘Latvian’ political 
entrepreneurs. Instead, as this section documents, the economic crisis has 
politically reinforced these ethnic boundaries. As such, pan-national 
 10 
intellectual and strategic engagement with economic issues is greatly 
constrained, which has made it difficult for the left to translate the crisis into 
political gains.  
In particular, the left’s intellectual responses to the crisis have been 
constrained by the need to retain core support among Russian speakers. 
Consequently, the LSP and other sections of the ‘Russian’ left have been 
reluctant to move beyond reliance on Soviet-era aesthetics. The radical left has 
largely continued to focus on the human and political rights of Latvia’s non-
citizens, the status of the Russian language in Latvia, and (especially for the 
LSP) the importance of the memory of Soviet victory in the Second World 
War. This has impeded the articulation of a coherent economic argument that 
could be consumed by a broader, non-ethnicised audience. At the same time, 
whereas Harmony has often tried to transcend such issues and to articulate a 
coherent, de-ethnicised alternative economic programme, it has been 
constantly forced to reemphasise its ethnic credentials or face losing support 
among its primary electorate.  
Abrupt changes in macro-economic conditions have been found to 
induce changes in the saliency of ethnicity.34 It was therefore unsurprising that 
Latvian politics experienced a renewed spike in ethnicisation following the 
crisis, most evidence in the series of controversial language and constitutional 
referendums that were initiated by various political organisations. Although the 
crisis peaked in 2008-9, it was not until 2010 that the real ethnicisation started. 
In the run-up to the October 2010 general election, the nationalist party For 
Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Movement (later forming the 
National Alliance coalition [NA] with the other main nationalist party All for 
Latvia!) announced plans to instigate a nationwide referendum to outlaw 
Russian as a language of instruction in Latvia’s publicly-funded schools.35 
Importantly, this successfully ensured the continued entrenchment of ethnicity 
as the most salient political cleavage in Latvian politics.  
Harmony Centre had been gradually trying to reduce its image as an 
exclusively Slavic/Russian party by including more ethnically-Latvian names 
on its party lists and ensuring that its public representatives all spoke fluent 
Latvian.36 Its main strategic response to the crisis had been to focus on 
concrete economic issues over ethnic ones, criticising the austerity reforms of 
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the incumbent government and highlighting the need for greater social 
guarantees.37 For example, SC leader Nils Ušakovs noted how the economic 
crisis brought Latvians and Russians together as ‘all are suffering equally from 
economic problems’.38 This strategy looked propitious after Ušakovs became 
the first ethnic Russian Riga Mayor in 2009 and SC was poised to become the 
largest Saeima party. Harmony Centre’s opponents feared that the economic 
consequences of the crisis might help it make gains among the ethnic Latvian 
electorate. In response, the National Alliance fell back on a familiar repertoire 
that forced SC to re-emphasise the interests of its (mainly Russian-speaking) 
electorate, thereby falling into the trap of increased ethnicisation. When 
Harmony Centre argued against the referendum initiative, nationalist parties 
inevitably found it easy to cast SC as pro-Russian and as ‘a hateful force 
towards Latvians’.39 
Ultimately, although the National Alliance did not succeed in gathering 
the required number of signatures for a nation-wide referendum (10 percent of 
the registered electorate), its actions reinforced ethnic boundaries.40 Perhaps 
predictably, the failed attempt to initiate a referendum led to a counter-reaction 
by Russian minority organisations and representatives. The previously fringe 
extreme-leftist United Latvia and Native Language, for example, were able to 
galvanise support for a counter-referendum that would make constitutional 
changes to give Russian the status of the second state language of Latvia.41  
SC had every good reason to reject a referendum initiative supported 
most prominently by individuals combining ultra-radical ethnic agendas and 
left-wing ideologies, particularly given its intention to appeal to the wider 
Latvian electorate and move beyond Latvia’s ethnicised cleavages. Indeed, 
reject is what it first did. However, in November 2011, the party reversed its 
stance and gave full support to the referendum.42  
Consequently, with SC’s backing, United Latvia and Native Language 
were successful in securing 187,378 signatures (from a required 154,379) in 
favour of staging a referendum. In the end, however, 75 percent opposed the 
introduction of Russian as a second language from a referendum turnout of 71 
percent of eligible voters. For David Lublin, this whole episode ‘serves as an 
example of how pressure from more extreme parties can help polarize more 
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moderate ethnic parties and leaders, among both the majority and the 
minority.’43  
For Harmony Centre, the referendum clearly illustrated the ethnic 
dilemma it faced. Because prominent SC politicians eventually backed the 
language initiative, they reinforced ‘Latvian’ portrayals of their party as pro-
Russian and anti-Latvian, diverting attention away from their economic 
programme of increased social spending. At the same time, as the referendum 
initiative gathered momentum, it simply became politically untenable for SC to 
ignore the demands of their predominantly Russian-speaking electorate. As the 
results of the referendum show, there was an almost exact match between 
ethnicity and either support or opposition to the Russian-language 
referendum.44  
Interestingly, the LSP’s strategic response to the referendum was 
generally one of neutrality, despite being part of the SC coalition. Party leader 
Rubiks stated that he would not participate in it and supported Latvia’s ‘status 
quo’.45 Unlike the extreme left who championed the referendum, the LSP 
doggedly upholds the communist ideal of internationalism and makes a point 
of publishing materials in both Russian and Latvian.  
In fact, this apparently virtuous stance is a symptom of the LSP’s 
deeper reluctance to make any meaningful strategic or intellectual changes to 
the party programme. The party’s official publication Latvian Socialist simply 
sidestepped the referendum issue completely.46 However, Soviet 
internationalism did not preclude some deeply Russocentric, ethnicised 
strategies. For instance, the LSP remains fixated on the topic of the Red 
Army’s victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War, one of the most 
divisive issues demarcating ethnic boundaries in contemporary Latvia.47 The 
importance of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ (as it is termed in Russia) in 
maintaining the political legitimacy both of the USSR and Vladimir Putin’s 
post-Soviet Russia is widely acknowledged. For the LSP, reverence for the 
Soviet/Russian interpretations of the conflict also underpins its party 
legitimacy. For example, the December 2009 edition of Latvian Socialist 
reported that the LSP’s most important annual achievement was organising the 
annual gathering for veterans of the Great Patriotic War at Kurgan Druzhby 
(cemetery in Belarus).  
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The same issue also reproduced four resolutions from the LSP’s Party 
Congress. Two (‘No to anti-communism’, ‘In support of an objective history of 
the Second World War’) focused exclusively on historical memory. The other 
two related to the ongoing economic crisis. These appeals emphasised ‘Support 
for small and medium-sized employers’, and that ‘The government needs to 
take responsibility for the crisis and the catastrophic fall in Latvians’ standard 
of living’. The latter included strong criticism of the right-wing government’s 
austerity policies. It is noticeable, however, that this resolution lacked any 
concrete policy proposals. 
Indeed, the LSP has made few detailed economic policies in response 
to the crisis. It has been rare for such issues to play a central role in its political 
strategy. The party has long argued that Latvia has undergone a far-reaching 
socio-economic crisis caused by ‘anti-people’ market reforms and corrupt 
elites in the context of imperialist globalisation.48 The major means whereby 
the LSP conceptualised the latest crisis was to juxtapose Latvia’s disastrous 
economic situation (high unemployment, shrinking manufacturing sector, 
critical outflow of labour to other EU countries) with the Soviet model (full 
employment, thriving manufacturing sector, inflow of skilled labour from the 
rest of the USSR).  
Overall, the party’s messages remain ritualistic, and framed in a 
familiar Soviet lexicon and aesthetics. Images in LSP publications, for 
example, depict Soviet statues, Red Army war veterans and pictures from the 
Second World War. This reflects a party that, like the Czech KSČM, has 
preferred to be the ‘introverted’ guardian of the Soviet sub-culture than 
fundamentally adapt to emerging challenges. It is true that the party has long 
called for mobilisation of left-wing parties, trade-unions and social-movements 
against the bourgeois government. Yet the LSP is utterly unable to further such 
mobilisation. After all, Latvia suffers from the general post-Soviet syndrome of 
weak social movements. In particular, trade unions are feeble and have few ties 
to political parties, let alone the left.49 The LSP has admitted that its contacts 
with trade unions are feeble.50 Moreover, it is an organisation less than 1000-
strong, which struggles to increase its ranks or impose internal discipline.51  
Indicatively, the reasons the youth organisation United Latvia gave for leaving 
the LSP in 2010 were political passivity and being a ‘Rubiks fanclub.’52 The 
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cumulative image is of a nostalgic entity, unwilling and unable to break with 
the traditions of the ‘Russian left’.   
 
The Consequences of the ‘Ethnic’ Ukrainian Crisis 
It is important to note that the recent development of RLPs in Latvia has also 
been shaped by external, geopolitical developments. Russia’s annexation of the 
Crimean peninsula in 2014, for example, had direct implications for Latvian 
RLPs. President Putin justified Russia’s actions in Crimea by citing the need to 
protect Russian speakers, and many were quick to highlight existing and 
potential parallels with the demographic and ethnic situation in Latvia.  
Owing to Latvia’s highly ethnicised political system, the ‘ethnic crisis’ 
had as significant effects on the left as the preceding economic one, forcing the 
‘Russian left’ to decide how to react to the heightened sensitivities surrounding 
the geopolitical changes. We refer to the Ukrainian crisis as ‘ethnic’, not 
because this was its sole essence, but because it was largely perceived in ethnic 
terms within Latvia’s political discourse. Consistent with the above, it is 
noticeable how the LSP has largely pursued a ‘status quo’ position, rarely 
mentioning this crisis, with the exception of lambasting the interference of US, 
EU and NATO imperialists in Ukraine’s affairs in favour of ‘nationalist’ and 
‘fascistic’ forces.53  
Consequently, this section focuses on the two other most significant 
‘Russian left’ parties in Latvia, Harmony and the Latvian Russian Union 
(LKS), whose responses to the Ukrainian crisis have been more dynamic than 
the SPL’s. The LKS evolved from the rump For Human Rights in United 
Latvia (PCTVL), the largest left-wing coalition in 1998-2002. PCTVL changed 
its name to the LKS in early 2014, which, we will argue, indicates noticeable 
ethnicisation and a departure from some of the core leftist values it had 
previously espoused. As detailed above, Harmony replaced PCTVL as the 
most electorally successful left party in Latvia, and remains the partner of 
choice for the LSP. Examining the political discourse of these two parties helps 
understand the ethnic pressures that continue to define Latvia’s political party 
system and how parties respond. As such, this section analyses data from the 
respective websites and party programmes of Harmony and the LKS from 
February to May 2014.54 
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Harmony’s public discourses during the period in question continued its 
above-noted desire to transcend ethnicity, a trend evident since the start of the 
economic crisis. The majority of news articles examined focused on concrete 
policies unrelated to identity or ethnicity questions. For example, the party 
called for the reversal of austerity policies that had reduced spending on 
education and medicine, a policy which, Harmony argued, would stimulate the 
economy and increase Latvia’s investment potential (Harmony, 19.02.14). The 
party also emphasised reducing the salience of ethnicity relative to economic 
prosperity. Consistent with its name, the party advocated inter-ethnic harmony, 
arguing that ‘our home is Latvia, and inhabitants of this land need to be united 
…ignoring questions of history, language and such like. Only under these 
conditions will Latvia become a “prosperous home”’ (Harmony 10.05.14). 
Harmony’s view of prosperity involved Latvia’s advantageous investment 
potential as a bridge between Europe and Russia (Harmony, 18.03.14), thereby 
conceptualising the EU and Russia as solutions to, rather than the causes of, the 
economic crisis. Overall, Harmony’s approach envisaged Latvians and 
Russians as equal participants in a globalised, socially-democratic Latvia, 
attracting investment from the EU and Russia alike.  
However, events in Ukraine forced the party to set out its official 
position on the new crisis (Harmony 05.03.14). In this document, Harmony 
tried to avoid taking sides and listed nine points including supporting the 
‘unconditional territorial integrity of Ukraine’, calling for ‘immediate, 
constructive dialogue between the EU, Russia, and Ukraine’, support for the 
rights of Ukraine’s national and linguistic minorities, and repudiating efforts of 
‘certain Latvian politicians to escalate the situation in Latvia by using rhetoric 
aimed against representatives of national minorities’. Harmony avoided 
explicit references to Russophones in Ukraine and argued that Russia’s actions 
there did not entail a threat to Latvia. It opposed the emergent EU/US sanctions 
regime against Russia. 
However, Harmony’s approach has reflected the tension between 
liberal and ethnic approaches in Latvia’s ‘militant democracy.’55 Despite its 
‘neutral’ stance, Harmony has continued to appeal to the aesthetics of memory 
among its predominantly Russian-speaking electorate. Victory Day (9 May) is 
an important symbolic date for many Russian speakers in Latvia as it marks 
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Victory of the Soviet Army over Nazi Germany in the Second World War.56 
Therefore, similarly to the LSP, Harmony employs the ‘Great Patriotic War’ as 
a legitimising discourse. For example, Harmony is actively involved in 
organising annual Victory Day celebrations in Riga.  
At the same time, Harmony has attempted to de-ethnicise these 
celebrations. In 2014, the single website article devoted to the events was 
entitled ‘Ušakovs asks for people to protect and love Latvia regardless of 
nationality’ (Harmony 10.05.14). In this article the party refers to the sacred 
memory of the people who fought against Nazism, but the discourse is framed 
in terms of loyalty to Latvia: ‘the children of the soldiers and veterans need to 
be worthy of their memory. They need to respect their state, Latvia, and trust in 
it.’  
Ultimately, the Ukraine crisis seriously compromised Harmony’s 
political neutrality. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and ongoing armed conflict 
in south-east Ukraine were significant themes in the May 2014 European and 
October 2014 Saeima elections. Harmony suffered a significant setback in 
May, losing six percent of its vote and one of two EP seats, largely because of 
its unconvincing stance: ‘[h]ardline Russophones voted for [the LKS] and the 
populist Alternative party while moderates switched their vote to the governing 
Unity (Vienotība) party’.57 Harmony’s contortions were starkly visible. The 
day after the EP elections, its website (referring to the LKS), warned that 
‘Radical Russian forces will enter the next Saeima’ (Harmony 26.05.14). 
However, only two days later, the website adopted a more radical, opposite 
view: 
Ethnic Latvians are scared because they’ve started to think what they 
would do if they were in the position of ethnic Russians in [Latvia]. 
After twenty-five years of persecution and insult they would also have 
turned to ‘radical leaders’ or ‘little green men’ for help.58 When there is 
a defender of the oppressed (he’s called VVP [Vladimir Vladimirovich 
Putin]), they are scared that Russian Latvians will turn to him 
(Harmony 28.05.14). 
 
Indeed, the ‘Putin question’ highlights Harmony’s problem in balancing 
economic and ethnic issues. Harmony has long had a co-operation agreement 
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with United Russia (Putin’s ruling party), and prior to the May election 
Ušakovs had announced in a TV interview in Moscow that Putin was the ‘best 
possible’ leader for Russia in the current climate. Harmony thereafter 
articulated a Janus-faced position of ‘largely denouncing Russian actions to 
Latvian audiences while speaking in a more subtle and supportive tone to 
Russophone ones’.59   
The pressures to adopt a more ethnicised tone and increased 
competition for the Russophone vote from radicalised ‘Russian’ parties were 
most evident in the emergence of the Latvian Russian Union in early 2014. The 
LKS’ predecessor, For Human Rights in United Latvia had always held 
Russophone rights central to its agenda, but had also articulated a left-leaning 
economic programme calling for higher social spending and greater state 
involvement in the economy.60 For example, its (pre-crisis) 2006 programme 
prioritised economic goals above ethnic ones, with the issues of status of the 
Russian language and non-citizenship appearing merely as the ninth and tenth 
headings.61 Instead, the programme promised to raise social guarantees ‘to the 
European level’, increase pensions and wages to the real living minimum, to 
spend no less than 8 percent of GDP on the health service, and to stimulate 
growth in Latvia’s export industries.  
Following the economic crisis, PCTVL’s strategic response was to 
emphasise its credentials as the party that supported the cultural and linguistic 
rights of Russian speakers. Its 2010 party programme pledged to turn Latvia 
into a ‘Baltic Luxemburg’ by facilitating multilingualism and using the 
Russian community as a unique economic resource to attract investments from 
the EU and Russia.62 Additionally, PCTVL started to refer to itself specifically 
as ‘the party of the Russian community in Latvia’ instead of a party generally 
supporting equal rights (as its name suggested).63  The economic component of 
the PCTVL programme did not disappear, but became less visible, especially 
because Harmony Centre’s overlapping social and economic messages were 
being articulated with more success, slicker marketing, and more dynamic 
(younger) personalities.   
In contrast, the Latvian Russian Union (as befitted its name) 
demonstrated a much narrower scope of interests focused exclusively on 
ethnicised issues such as the protection of Russian schools (LKS 03.03.14), 
 18 
celebration of Victory Day (LKS 16.03.14), calls for protests and pickets in 
support of Russia’s actions in Crimea (LKS 10.03.14), diatribes against corrupt 
western values (LKS 12.03.14), and highlighting ‘Russophobia’ and ‘anti-
Russian’ sentiments in the Baltic states (LKS 06.05.14). Policies beyond ethnic 
issues were largely ignored. Unsurprisingly, LKS’s ethnic stance became 
almost entirely congruent with contemporary Russian state discourses, with 
emphasis on the historical-cultural, spiritual, and civilizational uniqueness of 
the Russian nation and its separateness from ‘postmodern’ Europe and 
‘fascistic’ Latvia.64 Russia’s allegedly benevolent support for Russophone 
rights in Latvia were endorsed wholesale. On the question of Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea, LKS (20.05.14) adopted an entirely pro-Russian 
position: ‘the Russian army, as is natural, came to the defence of peaceful 
citizens and its co-citizens.’  
Analysis of Harmony and the LKS’s discourses at the time of turmoil in 
Ukraine is therefore very telling. Harmony highlights the duality of Latvia’s 
ethnicised and liberal-republican approaches to democracy, caught between 
focussing on socio-economic arguments but periodically feeling forced to 
revert to discourses of ethnic discrimination. In contrast, LKS demonstrates 
how it has been possible to transition from a socio-economically leftist party to 
a radicalised ethnic one, as anti-elite ethnic populism increasingly subsumed its 
economic programme during the economic and Ukrainian crises. In most 
contexts LKS would now be categorised as a radical right-wing party. 
However, amidst the peculiarities of Latvian politics, it remains popularly 
perceived as a party of the radical left.   
The electoral consequences of these processes have, as yet, been 
minimal. Harmony partially recovered from its May 2014 debacle, and despite 
losing votes in October 2014, maintained its position as Latvia’s biggest 
Saeima party with twenty-four seats (previously thirty-one) (Table 11.1). 
Although LKS leader Ždanoka stayed an MEP in May and the party doubled 
its previous Saeima vote in October, the modest 1.6 percent gained remained 
far below the required five-percent Saeima threshold. This gives grounds to 
suggest that heavily ethnicised Russian discourses lack resonance with the 
majority of Latvia’s Russian speakers, at least among the politically-
enfranchised members. Of course, we may also expect that LKS discourses 
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might have more impact among non-voting, non-citizens who generally 
articulate more allegiance to Russia than Latvia.65 Nevertheless, the analysis 
points to the continued salience of ethnicity within Latvian politics, 
demonstrating how the ‘Russian left’ has been unable to articulate coherent, 
de-ethnicised economic policies.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined why RLPs in Latvia have been unable to mobilise 
popular support following the 2008 crisis. The crisis, brought acute economic 
decline and rising unemployment to Latvia and governments enacted austerity-
based remedies. These could have boosted support for the radical left as in  
Greece, Spain and Portugal. Although the centre-left Harmony, with which the 
radical left Socialist Party is tied in long-term alliance, benefitted electorally in 
2010-11, it failed to capitalise on this success, while the LSP’s vote has 
stagnated.  
 We have argued that the major reason for the failure of the left and the 
radical left has been Latvia’s post-Soviet ethnicised party system which results 
in the left being viewed as a Russophone ‘fifth column’ as it struggles to 
separate leftist socio-economic preferences from ethnic concerns. As a 
consequence of this, the left remains divided and partially disenfranchised. In 
large part this is a legacy of Soviet occupation, which means that concepts such 
as socialism and a strong welfare state are closely tied to the Soviet experience. 
Moreover, the Ukrainian ‘ethnic crisis’ reminded many that the Soviet-era 
relationship between defence of minority rights and Russification is not 
historically obsolescent and accelerated the ethnicisation of the left.  
 Might the left have broken away from this situation, for example by 
adopting more auspicious supply-side strategies? Certainly, the division of 
forces into three often-competing parliamentary parties has often divided the 
left’s potential, albeit this division reflects real ideological divisions (social 
democratic, socialist and Russophile) among Latvia’s Russophones. Moreover, 
the consequence of Latvia’s ethnicisation leaves the left in a classic electoral 
bind: moving to the centre risks defection to more hard-line Russophile groups, 
while nourishing the Russophone electorate risks entrenching a ‘Russian’ 
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image antagonistic to many ethnic Latvians. The ethnic biases inherent in 
Latvia’s political system have entailed limited room for manoeuvre.  
Certainly, the strategies of the major left parties demonstrate this. 
Harmony’s attempts to articulate a coherent, de-ethnicised social-democratic 
position and alternative models to Latvia’s austerity programme have allowed 
it to become the dominant left player, eclipsing the more minority-focussed 
PCTVL and attracting some ethnic Latvians. Yet nationalist parties have been 
able to divert attention away from economic issues, forcing Harmony to re-
emphasise its ‘Russian’ position on support for the Russian language, rights for 
Russian speakers, and the historical interpretation of the Second World War.  
 As the most prominent RLP in Latvia, the LSP continues to articulate 
an all-too-familiar agenda: the lexicon and aesthetics of Soviet Marxism-
Leninism in all but name. Whereas its pragmatic alliances have allowed it a 
parliamentary niche, its subordinate position within these alliances has failed to 
nurture a sustainable, independent profile. Moreover, it has resisted substantive 
changes to its intellectual or strategic priorities, leaving it with a conservative 
communism that both fails to capture new audiences and immediately serves to 
ethnicise the party (and by extension Harmony), since for many in Latvia, 
Sovietisation equals Russification. 
 Finally, the Latvian Russian Union was originally a leftist minority-
rights party, and remains a radical left party in Latvian parlance, but now 
represents a radical right ethnic Russian party whose strategy has increasingly 
been to ignore economic issues almost entirely.  
 In these contexts, it is little wonder that the radical left has been so 
ineffective and that Latvia’s neo-liberal consensus has continued to dominate 
the political scene, despite the effects of a deep and socially devastating 
economic crisis.  
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